

СЕКЦІЯ ЗАГАЛЬНОГО МОВОЗНАВСТВА ТА ІНОЗЕМНИХ МОВ

UDC 1 (091) [14+16]

V. Chernyshov, PhD, Associate Professor
National University "Yuri Kondratyuk Poltava Polytechnic"

AN INTERPRETATION OF LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN'S "TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS" ACCORDING TO BERTRAND RUSSEL'S "INTRODUCTION" TO THE BOOK

The linguistic turn [1] of the first half of the twentieth century designated the shift in the intellectual culture from the paradigm of Modernity to something what we now may call the contemporary period of intellectual development in the Western Europe and North America.

Although Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* was one of the heralds of this turn, it could be barely understood then without an *Introduction* by Bertrand Russell. Russel's *Introduction* to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, however, was in its turn the very first critical interpretation of the text.

Russell sees in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* an attempt to construct a theory (or doctrine) of pure logic. It is notable that putting the idea of the *Tractatus* design in such a way, Russell – consciously or not – brings it together with the Kantian project of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Russell's interpretation focuses on the *Tractatus* structure.

First, Russell names the *parts* of the Wittgenstein's theory of pure logic on which the latter is discoursing: Symbolism, logical structure of proposition, the nature of logical inference, theory of knowledge, principles of physics, ethics, and the Mystical. Second, Russell analyses the problems of concern to Wittgenstein, observing that they are related to the areas of competence of psychology, 'the special sciences', and logic. There are two logical problems with respect to Symbolism; the twofold interpretation of facts (*Tatsache* vs *Sachverhalt*), which may remind of Leibniz's distinction between the *vérité de faits* and *vérité de raison*; atomic facts, atomic and molecular propositions. Third, Russell focuses on Wittgenstein's criticism and rejection of the conception of identity. Fourth, Russell believes that Wittgenstein's fundamental thesis of the *Tractatus* is that "it is impossible to say anything about the world as a whole, and that whatever can be said has to be about bounded portions of the world" [2, p. xvii]. Fifth, this thesis unexpectedly gives the key to solipsism: enables Wittgenstein to say that he has solved a problem that remained unsolved since the times of George Berkeley, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant: "What Solipsism intends is quite correct, but this cannot be said, it can only be shown" [2, p. xviii].

Finally, Russell brings forward a brief report on controversies that inspired the appearance of the *Tractatus*. “The problem of the logical form of belief, i.e. what is the schema representing what occurs when a man believes. (...)” [2, p. xix]. The problem of meaning, which has a logical and a psychological parts, and Wittgenstein’s attitude towards the mystical.

So, in brief, Russell summarises Wittgenstein position, saying that “Everything, therefore, which is involved in the very idea of the expressiveness of language must remain incapable of being expressed in language, and is, therefore, inexpressible in a perfectly precise sense” [2, p. xxi]. However, doing this, he expresses his scepticism, concerning Wittgenstein’s categoricity: “What causes hesitation is the fact that, after all, Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit” [2, p. xxi].

To overcome this contradiction, Russell suggests the solution, he writes: “These difficulties suggest to my mind some such possibility as this: that every language has, as Mr. Wittgenstein says, a structure concerning which *in the language*, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language dealing with the structure of the first language, and having itself a new structure, and that to this hierarchy of languages there may be no limit. Mr. Wittgenstein would of course reply that his whole theory is applicable unchanged to the totality of such languages. The only retort would be to deny that there is any such totality. The totalities concerning which Mr. Wittgenstein holds that it is impossible to speak logically are nevertheless thought by him to exist, and are the subject-matter of his mysticism” [2, p. xxii].

References

1. Rorty, Richard M. (ed.) *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method* / Edited by Richard M. Rorty; *With Two Retrospective Essays*. Chicago, London, 1967, 1992.
2. Wittgenstein L. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. London, New York, 1963. 166 p.

УДК 378.4

*А.В. Серета, ст.викладач
Національний університет
«Полтавська політехніка імені Юрія Кондратюка»*

ОСНОВНІ КРИТЕРІЇ НАВЧАННЯ ІНОЗЕМНОЇ МОВИ ДЛЯ СТУДЕНТІВ НЕМОВНИХ ЗВО

У сучасних умовах інтеграції України в європейське суспільство відбувається новий етап модернізації системи освіти та зростають вимоги до майбутніх фахівців. Спрямованість системи освіти на підвищення рівня знань майбутніх фахівців і формування їх професійної компетентності вимагають не тільки професійних знань, а й володіння іноземною мовою