

взаємодоповнювальну двочленну опозицію: *la vie – la mort*. Структурна класифікація оприявлює прості, похідні та складні антоніми, як-от: *joyeux – triste; connu – inconnu; content – pas content*. Розрізняють антоніми і в стилістичному аспекті – як загальномовні та контекстуальні. Водночас слід пам'ятати, що не існує слів, які б були антонімами в будь-якому контексті. Уважне вивчення відношення змістового протиставлення антонімів засвідчує, що антонімію детермінують на рівні контексту: *frais – tiède; maladif; sec; pourri* та ін.

У лексико-семантичній системі французької мови відношення змістового протиставлення спостережені й серед різного роду словосполучень, зокрема фразеологізмів: *être sur des roses – être sur des chardons*.

Антонімія тісно пов'язана з полісемією слова, водночас ця залежність складна. Оскільки слово може мати кілька значень, то 1) теоретично кожне із значень слів певних категорій може мати антонім; 2) практично не до кожного із значень відповідного слова існує антонім.

Отже, відношення змістового протиставлення в лексиці французької мови багатогранні й складні. Оскільки лексична система мови перебуває в постійному розвитку, незаперечним фактом є й еволюція антонімічних зв'язків.

Література

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THE CONCEPT OF A VIRTUE AND ITS INTERPRETATION IN NATURAL GOODNESS BY PHILIPPA FOOT

The foundation of the universal moral values is a recurring question of our time. Now and again, the twenty-first century raises this question in a renewed effort to overcome the twentieth century's relativism.

One of the principal dimensions of the most fundamental question of moral thought is, in its own turn, how one should understand the concept of virtue. Since Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the question of virtue has always been the foundation stone of traditional moral philosophy that claimed to be of universal

value. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this particular topic has been given particular attention by the representatives of Neo-Aristotelian and Thomistic movements.

Philippa Foot is one of the recognised representatives of the Neo-Aristotelian movement in the UK. Her notable book *Natural Goodness* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001) became a milestone that marked a new stage in developing, deepening, and understanding of the topic. The concept of a virtue is one of the central upon which Philippa Foot is focusing in her book.

Outlining the major task of her inquiry, which is focusing on *the nature of a virtue*, Philippa Foot says: “It is in the concept of a virtue that in so far as someone possesses it, his actions are good; which is to say that he acts well. Virtues bring it about that one who has them acts well, and we must enquire as to what this does and does not mean” [Foot 2001, 12]. Such a rational approach enables Foot to ask a question of how does one who possess a virtue distinguish from another who do not. The answer seems obvious: the distinguishing characteristic of the one who possesses a virtue from the other who does not is that those who possess “virtues possess them in so far as they recognize certain considerations (such as the fact of a promise, or of a neighbour's need) as powerful, and in many circumstances compelling, reasons for acting. They recognize the reasons, and act on them” [Foot 2001, 13]. Thus the description a *virtuous human being* “speaks of how it is with him or her in respect of the acceptance of a certain group of considerations as reasons for action” [Foot 2001, 13].

So describing virtues in terms of (a) the recognition of particular considerations as reasons for acting, and (b) the relevant action; it may seem that Philippa Foot has only been expressing familiar and time-honoured ideas of moral goodness. However, she insists that at the same time she has also been talking about practical rationality, since “the discussion has been about human goodness in respect of reason-recognition and reason-following” [Foot 2001, 13], which is just the case of practical rationality.

Considering practical rationality, Philippa Foot warns, however, that it should not be understood in terms of rival theories or alternative ideas, “but of the different parts of practical rationality, no one of which should be mistaken for the whole” [Foot 2001, 13]. Thus, she is trying to set the basis for a *unified theory of rationality*.

With respect to the question of moral virtues, this unified theory of rationality fully recognises that “Good hangs, too, on the careful and cognizant pursuit of many more particular ends, and in general in satisfying appetites and following desires” [Foot 2001, 17], which cannot but justify a reasonable modicum of self-interest. Moreover, that “virtues play a necessary part in the life of human beings as do stings in the life of bees” [Foot 2001, 35]. These considerations and the animal metaphor bring the reader to consider human being within the framework of traditional Aristotelian context as a *rational animal* (but nonetheless the animal), Philippa Foot writes: “The life cycle of a plant or animal

ultimately has to do with what is involved in development, self-sustenance, and reproduction. Are we really going to suggest that human strengths and weaknesses, and even virtues and vices, are to be identified by reference to such ‘biological’ cycles?” [Foot 2001, 41]. A rational animal bridges in itself the animal and the rational, which become two aspects of human being and determine human morality. That is why the status of virtues – as much as the status of other certain dispositions – “should be determined by quite general facts about human beings” [Foot 2001, 45].

Getting back to the problem of practical rationality with respect to human virtues, Philippa Foot says that one of the major aspects of the issue is “the rationality of doing what virtue demands” [Foot 2001, 53], especially for those who have an *objective theory of moral evaluation* (which is her case also). Philippa Foot suggests that in order to solve the issue one should reconsider one’s objective theory of moral evaluation on a meta-level – within the framework of higher questions – of human goodness, happiness and human good as well as revisit the question of immoralism.

“It is wrong to look for an independent criterion of practical rationality to which goodness in action must somehow be shown to conform. Instead, rational choice should be seen as an aspect of human goodness, standing at the heart of the virtues rather than out there on its own. [Foot 2001, 81]. Rationality of action is not to be discussed outside of the context of the relation between virtue and happiness, since happiness is humanity's good.

Лімепамыпа

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MODELLE DER AKTUELLEN GLIEDERUNG DES SATZES ALS MITTEL DER AGS

In der modernen Linguistik vertreten die meisten Wissenschaftler die Ansicht wonach die aktuelle Gliederung des Satzes ein organischer Teil der Syntax ist. Es wird darauf hingewiesen, dass diese Frage zum grammatikalischen Aspekt des Satzes gehört, entsteht im Prozess der Umsetzung einer kommunikativen Aufgabe gleichzeitig mit grammatischer Gliederung und wird als Kommunikationslast der Satzglieder verstanden.

Der Prozess der Gliederung eines Satzes in semantische Teile zeigt die Gedankenbewegung: was den Teilnehmern des Gesprächs bekannt ist, was noch